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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Richard Healey was injured when he fell through 
a floor opening of a construction project in Orem, Utah. Healey 
brought an action for personal injury against the general 
contractor of the project, Appellant A.B.P. Enterprises, Inc. 
("ABP"), the mechanical subcontractor, Appellee Clark Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc. ("Clark") and a subcontractor of Clark, 
Appellee J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. ("JB"), in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court ("District Court"). The claims of Healey were 
settled, and this appeal concerns cross-claims which ABP filed 
against Clark and JB seeking indemnification from Clark and JB 
for ABP/s own negligence. 
ABP moved for summary judgment for indemnity from Clark 
alleging that specific language in the ABP Development Company 
Contract ("Clark/ABP Agreement") provided indemnification to ABP 
for ABP's own negligence. ABP also moved for summary judgment 
against JB pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement ("Clark/JB 
Agreement") between Clark and JB. Clark and JB both filed Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment against ABP on the indemnity issues. 
The District Court denied ABP's motions and granted Clark's and 
JB's cross-motions. ABP then initiated this appeal seeking a 
reversal of the District Court's order. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues on appeal affecting Clark and the standards of 
appellate review are as follows: 
1. Whether, the District Court correctly found that the 
indemnity provisions of the Clark/ABP Agreement cannot reasonably 
be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that Clark 
indemnify ABP for ABP,s own negligence. 
As the District Court ruled as a matter of law, the 
proper standard of review is "correctness" giving no deference to 
the District Court's view of the law. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
v. Blomcmist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether, Clark is entitled to a judgment over against 
JB pursuant to the indemnification language in the Clark/JB 
Agreement, if this Court finds the District Court ruling to be 
incorrect on the issues of indemnification. 
The standard of review for this issue is also 
"correctness". 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statute is determinative in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. (The statute is set out in full in 
Exhibit "A"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
ABP seeks review of the District Court's denial of ABP's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for indemnity from Clark and 
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JB and from the District Courts Orders granting Clark/s and JB's 
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. In the event that this Court 
finds the Orders of the District Court to be incorrect, Clark 
seeks a judgment over against JB pursuant to the Clark/JB 
Agreement. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Richard Healey sued the Owner and General Contractor, 
ABP, a subcontractor, Clark and a sub-subcontractor, JB in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court for recovery for personal injuries 
sustained from a fall while working at the Word Perfect 
construction site. (R. 101.) ABP filed a Cross-Claim against 
Clark and JB for indemnity. (R. 1255). Clark filed a Cross-
Claim against JB for indemnity. (R. 236). 
ABP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking indemnity 
against Clark on November 12, 1992. (R. 1053). On December 21, 
1992, Clark filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss 
ABP's indemnification claims. (R. 2123). The District Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision on February 10, 1993, (R. 1720 and 
Exhibit "B") and in an Order dated March 9, 1993, the District 
Court denied ABP's Motion and granted Clark's Cross-Motion 
holding that the indemnify provisions of the contract between ABP 
and Clark make reference to liability that may arise from Clark's 
performance of the contract, but cannot reasonably be interpreted 
as evidencing any intent of the parties that Clark indemnify ABP 
for ABP's own negligence. (R. 2058 and Exhibit "C"). The 
District Court also stated that the contract's indemnity clause 
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makes reference to liability that may arise from Clark's 
performance. However, the District Court noted that their is no 
similar reference to possible liability arising from ABP's 
actions. (R. 2058 and Exhibit "C"). 
On November 24, 1992, ABP filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment seeking indemnity from JB based on the Clark/JB 
Agreement. (R. 1186). On December 18, 1992, JB filed its Cross-
Motion. (R. 1272). In the Memorandum Decision dated February 
10, 1993 (R. 1720) and in an Order and Judgment dated March 9, 
1993 (R. 2058) the District Court denied ABP's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against JB. In a Memorandum Decision dated June 21, 
1993 (R. 2143), and in an Order and Judgment dated September 
13th, 1993, the District Court granted JB's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment against ABP. (R. 2174). 
After Clark learned of ABP's intent to appeal the 
District Court's rulings on the indemnification issues, and in an 
attempt to reach a final judgment, Clark moved the District Court 
for a Judgment on Clark's Cross-Claim against JB. (R. 2017 and 
2120). JB filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Clark's 
Cross-Claim on June 30th, 1993. (R. 2146). On October 4, 1993, 
the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision (R. 2176) and on 
October 18, 1993, the District Court signed an Order denying 
Clark's motion for summary judgment and granting JB's Cross-
Motion. (R. 2180). 
On November 8, 1993, ABP filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 
2187). Attempting to secure a judgment over against JB if this 
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Court reversed the rulings of the District Court, Clark filed a 
Notice of Cross Appeal on November 15, 1993, (R. 2191). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The action in the District Court involved a fall at a 
construction site at 1555 North Technology Way in Orem, Utah, on 
March 7, 1991. (R. 103). The plaintiff, Richard Healey, was 
employed by Gene Peterson Concrete. In the process of their 
work, Healey and a co-employee moved a large section of heating 
duct, exposing an opening in the floor. Healey fell through the 
opening sustaining personal injuries. (R. 101). 
Healey alleged in his Complaint that the opening in the 
floor was cut by an employee of JB. (R. 101). The hole was 
covered with a large section of heating duct, by employees of 
ABP. Healey alleged that ABP, Clark, and JB were negligent in 
failing to properly cover the opening and in failing to provide a 
safe place to work. (R. 100). The District Court did not 
apportion fault among the parties because Healey's claims were 
settled. 
Clark was a subcontractor of ABP, engaged to coordinate 
all labor and material to install the mechanical system at the 
construction project. (R. 664). JB was a subcontractor of Clark 
engaged to provide all labor and material to install all duct 
work for air distribution in the building being constructed. 
(R. 664). 
On September 17, 1990, ABP and Clark executed the 
Clark/ABP Agreement. (R. 631 and Exhibit "D"). The Clark/ABP 
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Agreement was drafted by ABP, and had been used by ABP on all 
buildings constructed at the Word Perfect site. (R. 631). The 
Clark/ABP Agreement contained indemnification language that 
provided that Clark would indemnify and save ABP harmless from 
and against any and all loss, damage, injury, liability, and 
claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons, and all loss 
of or damage to property of others, resulting directly or 
indirectly from Clark's performance of the contract. (R. 630). 
On October 23, 1990, Clark and JB executed the Clark/JB 
Agreement. (R. 628 and Exhibit "E"). The Clark/JB Agreement 
provided that JB would assume toward Clark all the obligations 
that Clark assumed toward ABP. (R. 627). It also provided that 
JB agreed to be bound by the provisions of the Clark/ABP 
Agreement. (R. 628). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The strict construction rule relating to indemnity 
agreements continues to be the law in Utah. Under this rule, 
there is a presumption against an intent to indemnify for an 
indemnitee's own negligence unless that intention is clearly and 
unequivocally expressed. 
II. The District Court was correct in holding that the 
language of the Clark/ABP Agreement does not express any intent 
to indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. The District Court 
correctly noted that the indemnification provision in question 
makes reference to liability that may arise from Clark's 
performance of the contract, however, their is not similar 
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reference to possible liability arising from the contractors 
actions. 
ABP's reliance on Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co. . 793 
P.2d 362 (Utah 1990), to support its argument of indemnity is 
misplaced. The indemnification provision in the Clark/ABP 
Agreement is not similar to the indemnification agreement in 
Freund. The facts and circumstances surrounding the Clark/ABP 
Agreement do not evidence any intent by the parties that Clark 
indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. Moreover, there is no 
evidence from other language in the Clark/ABP Agreement 
suggesting that the parties intended that Clark indemnify ABP for 
ABP's own negligence. 
ABP's allegations that the key indemnification language 
in Freund is similar to the key language in the Clark/ABP 
Agreement is incorrect. The Freund court found that several 
provisions were "key" in supporting the court's finding of 
indemnification. Moreover, the Freund court focused upon the 
"broad sweeping" language of the indemnification provision. The 
indemnification language found in the Clark/ABP Agreement is 
substantially limited in comparison to the language in Freund. 
The language in the Clark/ABP Agreement limits indemnification 
solely to liability arising from Clark's performance of the 
contract. 
III. The Utah comparative negligence law has no bearing 
on the interpretation of the Clark/ABP Agreement. ABP failed to 
raise this issue in the District Court. Consequently, matters 
7 
which are not a part of the record in the trial court cannot be 
considered in connection with an appeal. 
ABP cannot request that this Court rewrite the Clark/ABP 
Agreement. It is a basic rule of contract law that a court will 
not make a better contract for the parties than they have made 
for themselves. Moreover, the Clark/ABP Agreement was drafted by 
ABP and this Court should construe the contract against the 
drafter. 
The Utah comparative negligence law has no substantive 
effect on the Clark/ABP Agreement. Furthermore, the Agreement 
has meaning, even in light of the comparative negligence law. 
IV. ABP's indemnity claims violate Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-8-1. The Clark/ABP Agreement clearly involves the 
construction industry. Moreover, if one accepts ABP's 
interpretation of the indemnification provision, Clark would be 
required to indemnify ABP for ABP's sole negligence. The 
Clark/ABP Agreement contains no language excepting Clark for 
indemnifying ABP in situations were liability results from ABP's 
sole negligence. This Court's recent decision in Jacobsen 
Construction v. Blaine Construction, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 
App. 1993) is controlling. Consequently, ABP's claims for 
indemnification are against public policy, void and 
unenforceable. 
V. If this court finds that Clark must indemnify ABP for 
ABP's own negligence then Clark is entitled to a judgment over 
against JB. In the Clark/JB Agreement, JB assumed toward Clark 
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all the obligations and responsibilities that Clark assumed 
toward ABP. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STRICT CONSTRUCTION RULE OF INDEMNITY 
AGREEMENTS IS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND SHOULD 
NOT BE RELAXED. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Freund v. Utah Power & Light 
CO,, 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990), reiterated the well established 
rule that "an indemnity agreement which purports to make a party 
respond for the negligence of another should be strictly 
construed." Id, at 370, Furthermore, the Court stated that "a 
party is contractually obligated to assume ultimate financial 
responsibility for the negligence of another only when that 
intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed," Id, at 370, 
Following the well-established law in Utah, the Utah 
Supreme Court applied the strict construction rule in Freund, Ir 
the indemnification cases which have followed Freund, the Utah 
Supreme Court and this Court have continued to apply the strict 
construction rule to indemnification agreements which purport to 
indemnify for one's own negligence. Most recently, in Ericksen 
v. Salt Lake City Corp,. 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court, applying the strict construction rule used by the 
Court in Freund, affirmed the trial court's ruling that the 
indemnification language of the contract did not clearly and 
unequivocally express an intent by the parties to indemnify for 
one party's own negligence and that the indemnitee's reliance on 
Freund was misplaced. 
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Also, this Court in Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers. 
Inc.. 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991), reiterated the 
indemnification standards set by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Freund. This Court held that Utah Courts continue to apply the 
rule of strict construction when confronted with an indemnity 
agreement.l 
There can be no doubt that the strict construction rule 
relating to indemnification agreements, which purport to 
indemnify a party for that party's own negligence, is still the 
law in the State of Utah. Despite ABP,s contentions, the strict 
construction rule still serves a vital purpose, especially in the 
construction industry where safety is such an important issue. 
Any legal rule that discourages carelessness serves a purpose. 
Liability insurance may shift the financial burden, as pointed 
out by ABP, however, that reasoning is not comforting to an 
employee who is injured as a result of carelessness on the part 
of another. 
Moreover, in the construction industry, general 
contractors continue to enjoy greater bargaining power than the 
Specifically this Court stated: 
The Utah courts apply the rule of strict construction 
when confronted with an indemnity agreement. 
Pickover v. Smith Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664, 666 
(Utah App. 1989). Under this rule, there is a 
presumption against an intent to indemnify unless 
that intention is clearly and unequivocally 
expressed. Id. at 667 (quoting Union Pacific 
Railroad v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah 2d 
255, 408 P.2d 910, 913 (1956)). 
10 
subcontractors competing for work. The strict construction rule 
provides at least some protection to a subcontractor forced to 
enter into a contract drafted by a general contractor. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
CLARK AND ABP DOES NOT EXPRESS ANY INTENT THAT 
CLARK INDEMNIFY ABP FOR ABP'S OWN NEGLIGENCE. 
ABP maintains that Clark has contractually agreed to 
indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. ABP, in support of its 
indemnification claim, relies upon specific language in the 
Clark/ABP Agreement.2 However, the finding of the District Court 
is correct. The indemnity provisions relied upon by ABP cannot 
reasonable be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.3 ABP cites 
Freund. as sole support of its indemnification claim. ABP's 
2
 The language in the contract relied on by ABP is as 
follows: 
(a) General Liability: Sub-Contractor [Clark] shall 
indemnify and save General Contractor [ABP], its officers 
or agents harmless from and against any and all loss, 
damage, injury, liability, and claims thereof for 
injuries to or death of persons, and all loss of or 
damage to property of others, resulting directly or 
indirectly from subcontractor's [Clark's] performance of 
this contract. (Emphasis added). 
3
 The District Court in its Memorandum Decision stated: 
Based upon its interpretation of the relevant 
terms of the contract between ABP and Clark, the 
Court finds that the indemnity provisions cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent 
of the parties that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's 
own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause 
clearly makes reference to liability that may 
arise from the subcontractor's performance. Their 
is no similar reference to possible liability 
arising from the contractor's actions. 
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reliance on Freund is misplaced. 
1. The Indemnification Provision in the Clark/ABP 
Agreement is not similar to the indemnification 
agreement in Freund. 
ABP alleges that the indemnification provision in Freund 
is very similar to the agreement currently before this Court. In 
truth, however, the two agreements are entirely different. The 
indemnification language in Freund was clearly broad sweeping. 
The indemnification language provided for indemnification "from 
any and all liability arising out of the attachment of cable 
equipment to poles."4 
The indemnification provision, which is the subject of 
this appeal, limits Clark's duty of indemnification to injuries 
4
 The Utah Supreme Court in Freund referred to a portion of 
the indemnification provision as follows: 
The first sentence of that paragraph provides for 
indemnity from "any and all" liability arising out 
of the attachment of cable equipment to poles: 
Licensee [Jones] shall indemnify, protect, and 
save harmless Licensor [UP & L] from and 
against any and all claims, demands, causes of 
action, costs or other liabilities for damages 
to property and injury or death to persons 
which may arise out of or be connected with 
the erection, maintenance, presence, use or 
removal of Licensee's equipment, or of 
structures, guys and anchors, used, installed 
or placed for the principal purpose of 
supporting Licensee's equipment or by any act 
of Licensee on or in the vicinity of 
Licensor's poles, including, but not by way of 
limitation, payments made under workmen's 
compensation laws. 
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resulting from Clark,s performance of the contract.5 The broad 
sweeping language of the Freund provision did not limit the 
indemnification to one parties performance. Rather, the 
indemnification related to any and all liability arising out of 
the attachment of cable equipment to poles. 
The express indemnification provision in the Clark/ABP 
Agreement does not remotely compare to the Freund provision. 
Rather, the Clark/ABP provision clearly expresses the intent of 
the parties that Clark indemnify ABP only for losses arising out 
of Clark's performance of the sub-contract agreement. 
Consequently, there can be no question that the language relied 
upon by ABP does not overcome the presumption against 
indemnification for one's own negligence. Furthermore, the 
language in no way expresses a clear and unequivocal intent on 
the part of Clark to indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. 
2. The Facts and Circumstances in Freund are Very 
Different From the Facts and Circumstances 
Surrounding the Clark/ABP Agreement. 
Despite ABP's contentions, the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the Freund case are very different from the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the case at hand. The facts and 
5
 Specifically the indemnification provision in the 
Clark/ABP Agreement states: 
Sub-contractor shall indemnify and save general 
contractor, its officers or agents harmless from and 
against any and all loss, damage, injury, liability, and 
claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons, and 
all loss of or damage to property or others, resulting 
directly or indirectly from subcontractor's performance 
of this contract. (Emphasis added). 
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circumstances in Freund clearly support an intent by the parties 
of indemnification for the indemnitee's own negligence. However, 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the Clark/ABP Agreement 
support no such contention. 
In Freund, the plaintiff was injured when he came in 
contact with an electrical power line as he was splicing 
amplifiers into television cable previously hung on utility poles 
owned by defendant, Utah Power & Light (UP&L). UP&L granted 
permission to the cable company to attach cables to UP&L's 
existing utility poles provided the cable company would indemnify 
UP & L from any and all liability relating to attaching the cable 
to the Utility Poles. 
UP&L granted permission to the cable company to use 
UP&L's existing utility poles. The poles had been in place for 
many years and UP&L, although willing to allow use of the poles 
by the cable company, was not willing to take responsibility for 
the condition of the existing poles. 
In the case at hand, Clark entered into a subcontract 
agreement with ABP relating to the construction of an office 
building on the Word Perfect compound. Clark agreed to 
coordinate all labor and material to install the mechanical 
system at the construction site. ABP was the general contractor 
on the project. The construction involved was new construction, 
and Clark was engaged to perform a part of the new construction. 
Freund, did not involve a construction contract as ABP 
alleges. UP & L had no involvement in the contract other than to 
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allow the cable company to use its existing poles• ABP, on the 
other hand, was the general contractor on the Work Perfect 
building project and had primary responsibility for the 
construction of the building. Consequently, by the express 
language of the agreement, Clark's duty to indemnify ABP related 
only to liability arising from Clark's performance of the 
contract. Nothing in the facts or circumstances surrounding the 
case at hand nor in the conduct of either Clark or ABP suggests 
an intent that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. 
3. There is No Evidence From Other Language in the 
Clark/ABP Agreement of the Parties' Intent that Clark 
Indemnify ABP for ABP's Own Negligence. 
Unlike Freund. the Clark/ABP contract, when read as a 
whole, does not provide any evidence supporting ABP's claim to 
indemnification. The contract in Freund, however, when taken as 
a whole, contained numerous references indicating a clear intent 
by the parties for the cable company to indemnify UP & L for UP & 
L's own negligence. 
For example, in Freund, the court looked to several 
provisions in the contract for support of the parties' intent to 
indemnify. The court pointed out that the second sentence of the 
indemnity provision, clearly and unequivocally provided that the 
cable company's indemnity obligation extended to UP & L's actions 
which may cause interruption with the cable company's service. 
Further, the second sentence also provided an exception to 
indemnification for UP&L's willful negligence or intentional 
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wrongdoing.6 
Additionally, the Freund court pointed to other language 
in the contract in which the cable company agreed to indemnify 
UP&L with "full and complete indemnification for all claims of 
whatever nature," including" defense of any suits."7 The 
Clark/ABP Agreement, when taken as a whole, does not express in 
any way, let alone clearly and unequivocally, an intent by the 
parties that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. ABP 
is unable to point to any other language in the contract 
supporting any suggestion on the part of the parties to indemnify 
ABP for its own negligence. 
6
 Specifically the contract language cited by the court 
states: 
Except for intentional wrongdoing or willful negligence 
on the part of licensor, or any of its agents or 
employees, Licensee shall also indemnify, protect, and 
save harmless Licensor from and against any and all 
claims, demands, causes of action, costs, or other 
liabilities arising from any interruption, discontinuance 
or interference with licensee's service which may be 
occasioned or which may be claimed to have been 
occasioned by any action of Licensor pursuant to or 
consistent with this agreement. 
7
 The third sentence states: 
This indemnification agreement by Licensee in favor of 
Licensor with full and complete indemnification, 
including defense of any suits, actions or other legal 
proceedings resulting from any claims for damages to 
property and injury or death to persons and shall apply 
to all claims, demands, suits, and judgments of whatever 
nature which shall be made or assessed against Licensor 
in furnishing such poles under the terms of this 
agreement or for any other thing done or omitted in 
conjunction with Licensor's dealings with Licensee. 
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4. The Key Language in Freund is Not Similar to the Key 
Language in the Clark/ABP Agreement. 
ABP would have this court believe that the key language 
of the Clark/ABP Agreement is identical to the key language in 
the Freund contract. ABP focuses on the single word "liability" 
contained in both indemnity provisions. The word "liability" 
standing alone has no meaning. The word is given its meaning 
when properly taken in context with the entire sentence. 
As discussed above, the Freund court found that several 
provisions were "key" in supporting the court's finding that the 
intent of the parties was to indemnify UP & L for its own 
negligence. Furthermore, the "key" language in the Clark/ABP 
contract is the language that ABP chooses to ignore. Clark 
agreed only to indemnify ABP for liability "resulting directly or 
indirectly from Clark's performance of this contract." As 
indicated by the district court in its Memorandum Decision, this 
"key" language clearly limits the scope of Clark's indemnity 
obligations to ABP. The district court stated, "Their is no 
similar reference to possible liability arising from the 
contractor's [ABP] actions." 
III. THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW HAS NO BEARING ON 
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT. 
1. This Court Cannot Consider ABP's Argument In 
Connection With This Appeal. 
ABP argues, for the first time, that the comparative 
negligence law requires that this court interpret the Clark/ABP 
indemnification provision to provide for indemnification for 
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ABP's own negligence. ABP basis its argument on the premise that 
to interpret the indemnity provision any other way renders the 
provision meaningless. 
ABP's argument is without merit. Moreover, ABP's 
argument must fail because the argument was not raised in the 
lower court. The well-recognized rule of appellate review 
provides that matters which are not a part of the record in the 
trial court cannot be considered in connection with an appeal. 
Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978). 
2. The Clark/ABP Contract Should Not Be Construed To 
Provide For Indemnity For ABP's Own Negligence. 
ABP argues that this Court should evaluate the parties 
intent in light of comparative negligence, which, according to 
ABP, would require Clark to indemnify ABP for ABP's own 
negligence. ABP's argument must fail for several reasons. 
First, the most basic law of contract construction is 
that a court will not make a better contract for the parties than 
they have made for themselves.8 ABP, contrary to this basic law 
of contract construction is asking this court to, in effect, 
rewrite the Clark/ABP contract to provide indemnification to ABP 
for ABP's own negligence. 
Second, the Clark/ABP contract was drafted by ABP. It is 
well-settled law in the State of Utah that a contract will be 
8
 See, Rio Alqom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd, 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1980). 
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construed against its drafter.9 ABP, as drafter of the contract 
in question, had every opportunity to draft the contract in such 
a way as to eliminate any controversy as to whether ABP would be 
indemnified for its own negligence. Rather, ABP chose to base 
indemnification on Clark's performance of the contract, and made 
no mention of indemnification for its own negligence. 
Consequently, the contract must be construed against ABP and in 
favor of Clark. 
Third, ABP's reliance on the Utah comparative negligence 
law to provide meaning to the indemnification provision in 
question is erroneous. As discussed above, the indemnification 
language in question does not meet the requirements of the strict 
construction rule. Nothing in the facts and circumstances of 
this case and nothing in the Clark/ABP Agreement evidences any 
intent on the part of either party to require Clark to indemnify 
ABP for ABP's own negligence. ABP is simply attempting to use 
the Utah comparative negligence law by masquerading the law as 
having some kind of substantive effect on indemnification 
agreements. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
In support of its argument ABP cites Washington National 
Insurance Co. v. Sherwood Assoc. 795 P.2d 665 (Utah. App. 1990). 
However, the Washington National case has no relevance to the 
9
 See, Parks Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 
918 (Utah 1982); See also Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 
(Utah 1982) (in which the Supreme Court of Utah held that any 
uncertainty with respect to construction of a contract should be 
resolved against the party who has drafted the agreement). 
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case at hand. In Washington National, the law at issue related 
to curing a defect in a judicial foreclosure action. The law had 
a substantive effect on the case and controlled the outcome. In 
the case at hand, the comparative negligence law has no 
substantive or legal effect on the contracting parties rights 
under the contract. 
Moreover, the indemnification language in the Clark/ABP 
Agreement has meaning despite the comparative negligence law. 
There can be no question that the language of the indemnification 
agreement would require Clark to indemnify ABP for any liability 
imposed upon ABP as a result of Clark's non-performance of the 
contract. For example, if a subcontractor of Clark performed 
substandard work, and Clark refused to remedy the work, ABP could 
certainly remedy the work and then seek indemnification from 
Clark pursuant to the indemnification language of the Clark/ABP 
Agreement. 
IV. ABP'S INDEMNITY CLAIMS VIOLATE UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 13-8-1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 provides that a contract to 
construct a building containing an indemnity provision purporting 
to indemnify the promisee against liability resulting from the 
sole negligence of the promisee is against public policy and is 
void and unenforceable.10 ABP's indemnity claims are void and 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 in pertinent part provides: 
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, 
or in connection with or collateral to, a contract or 
agreement relative to the construction, alteration, 
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unenforceable as provide in Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. ABP argues 
that the indemnification agreement in question does not purport 
to indemnify ABP for its sole negligence. However, ABP,s own 
argument for indemnification is the basis for the applicability 
of § 13-8-1. 
If this Court were to accept ABP's argument for 
indemnification, the indemnification agreement would be void. 
The interpretation that ABP has placed upon the language of the 
Clark/ABP Agreement could result in Clark indemnifying ABP for 
ABP's sole negligence. ABP argues that "the ABP Agreement also 
indemnifies ABP against "liabilities" and therefore, as in 
Freund, the ABP Agreement covers those situations where ABP is 
liable, including liability for its own negligence." See Brief 
of Appellant p. 13. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the language of the 
indemnification clause in the Clark/ABP Agreement excepting Clark 
from indemnifying ABP for ABP's sole negligence. Consequently, 
ABP's claim for indemnification is against public policy and is 
void and unenforceable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah 
repair or maintenance of a building. . . , purporting to 
indemnify the promisee against liability for damages 
arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to 
property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence 
of the promisee . . . , is against public policy and is 
void and unenforceable. 
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addressed the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 in a 
case11 involving an indemnification clause similar to the one at 
hand.12 The Wollam court first addressed whether the language of 
the contract clearly and unequivocally expressed the intent of 
the parties to indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's own 
negligence. The Federal Court, relying upon the Utah Supreme 
Court decision of Union Pacific Railroad v. El Paso, 408 P.2d 910 
(Utah 1965) held that the language of the contract did not 
express a clear and unequivocal intent to indemnify the 
indemnitee for the indemnitee7s own negligence. 
Furthermore, the court, addressing the issue of whether 
the indemnification language was void and unenforceable pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1, held that because the indemnification 
provision failed to limit the indemnification obligation to 
situations where the indemnitee was not the sole responsible 
party, the provision was against public policy and void.13 
11
 See Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 663 F.Supp. 268 (Dist.Utah 
1987) . 
12
 The indemnification clause in the Wollam case states: 
Seller hereby assumes the risk of any and all 
accidental or negligent injuries or death, occasioned by 
anything occurring in or about the execution and 
performance of this purchase order or the doing of any 
and all work thereunder, and hereby releases the 
purchaser of and from any and all actions and claims on 
account thereof. 
13
 Specifically the Court stated: 
In addition, paragraph 8 fails to state that 
Stockmar will not indemnify Kennecott if Kennecott is the 
sole cause of an injury or damage. Thus, if the general 
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Clearly, the indemnification language of the Clark/ABP contract 
fails to state that Clark will not indemnify ABP if ABP is the 
sole cause of an injury. Thus, if the general indemnification 
language is read, as ABP argues it should be read, then it 
provides for indemnification for ABP's own negligence, including 
instances where the injury resulted from ABP's sole negligence. 
ABP argues that this Court's recent decision in Jacobsen 
Construction v. Blaine Construction, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 
App. 1993) is distinguishable from this case. In truth, however, 
the Jacobsen Construction case is controlling. In Jacobsen this 
court was faced with a fact situation on point with the fact 
situation of this case. Both cases involve injuries to 
employee's of concrete subcontractors who were injured by falling 
through holes in the floors during the construction of large 
buildings. Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 is more easily applied to the 
indemnification provision in the Clark/ABP contract than the 
indemnification provision in Jacobsen. 
In Jacobsen, the indemnification provision in question 
contained an exception from indemnification for the sole active 
negligence of the indemnitee.14 Nevertheless, this Court held 
language is read to provide indemnification for 
Kennecott's own negligence, it fails to limit that 
obligation to situations where Kennecott is not the sole 
responsible party. In those circumstances, such an all 
encompassing indemnification provision is against public 
policy is void and unenforceable. 
14
 The indemnity provision provides as follows: 
Subcontractor shall indemnify contractor and/or 
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that because there was no exception for indemnification if the 
indemnitee were solely and passively negligent the 
indemnification agreement was void and unenforceable.15 In the 
Clark/ABP contract there is no exception from indemnification 
when injury results from ABP's sole negligence whether passive or 
active. Furthermore, an acceptance of ABP's interpretation of 
the indemnification provision, would include indemnification for 
situations where injury resulted from the sole negligence of ABP. 
Clearly, Jacobsen is controlling and ABP's interpretation of the 
indemnification language renders the indemnification language 
void and unenforceable as against public policy, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-8-1. 
V. IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT CLARK MUST INDEMNIFY ABP 
FOR ABP'S OWN NEGLIGENCE THEN CLARK IS ENTITLED TO 
A JUDGMENT OVER AGAINST JB SHEET METAL. 
The Clark/JB Agreement provides that JB assumes toward 
Clark all the obligations and responsibilities that Clark assumed 
owner against, and save each harmless from: 
(2) any and all loss, damage, injury, liability and 
claims thereof for injuries to or death to persons and 
loss of or damages to property resulting directly or 
indirectly from subcontractor's performance of this 
agreement, regardless of the negligence of owner, the 
contractor, or their agents or employees; provided that 
where such loss, damage, injury, liability or claims are 
the result of active negligence on the part of owner or 
contractor or their respective agents or employees, and 
is not caused or contributed to by an omission to perform 
some duty also imposed on subcontractor, its agents or 
employees, such indemnity shall not apply to such party 
guilty of such active negligence unless the prime 
contract otherwise provides. 
15
 Id. at 21. 
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toward ABP.16 Further, JB agreed to be bound by the terms of the 
prime contract (Clark/ABP Agreement). Consequently, if Clark is 
obligated to indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence, then JB has 
agreed to assume that same obligation toward Clark. Clark would 
be entitled to a judgment over against JB for any indemnification 
obligation assessed against Clark. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Clark respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the ruling of the District Court. This 
Court should also rule that the indemnity provision is void under 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. In the event this court reverses the 
ruling of the district court, then Clark is entitled to a 
judgment over against JB. 
DATED this / H^ day of March, 1994. 
STRONG/&/HANNI 
Glenn C. Hanni 
H. Burt Ringwood 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Clark Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc. 
16 The specific language of the Clark/JB Agreement reads: 
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all 
the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor 
assumes toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall 
indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save 
them harmless from, any and all loss, damage, expense, 
costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on 
account of any breach of the provisions or covenants of 
this contract. 
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13-8-1. Construction industry — Agreements to indemnify. 
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in connection with 
or collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alter-
ation, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, highway, appurtenance 
and appliance, including moving, demolition and excavating connected there-
with, purporting to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages aris-
ing out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or result-
ing from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or 
indemnitee, is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. 
This act will not be construed to affect or impair the obligations of contracts 
or agreements, which are in existence at the time the act becomes effective. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 35, § 1. Compiler's Notes. — The term "the time 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this the act becomes effective" refers to the effective 
act" refers to Laws 1969, ch. 35, which enacted date of Laws 1969, ch. 35, which was May 13, 
this section. 1969. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 910400292 PI 
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON dba GENE 
PETERSON CONCRETE 
Third-Party 
Defendant 
The Court has received and fully considered the following motions now pending in 
this case: 
1. A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of 
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Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical Contractors Inc. 
2 Clark Mechanical's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement. 
3 . A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of 
Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal. 
4 . J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement. 
5 . A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement Against Plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing. 
The Court hereby denies the first motion enumerated above and accordingly grants 
Clark Mechanical's cross-motion on the issue of indemnity. Based upon its inteipretation of 
the relevant terns of the contract between A.B.P. and Clark, the Court finds that the 
indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause 
clearly makes reference to liability that may arise from the subcontractor's performance. 
Their is no similar reference to possible liability arising from the contractor's actions. 
The Court would be inclined to deny the third motion enumerated above on similar 
grounds, based upon the contractual language at issue. However, no contractual privity 
exists between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal; and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between Clark and J. B. Sheet 
Metal. Hence, the motion must be denied in any event. 
With regard to the fourth and fifth motions enumerated above, the Court grants the 
motions in part and denies them in part. Consistent with the Court' s prior ruling on Clark's 
motion for summary judgement, the court rules that plaintiffs "Fifth Cause of Action" is 
invalid to the extent that it is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract 
between A.B.P. Enterprises and Clark Mechanical or the contract between Clark Mechanical 
and J.B. Sheet Metal. Based upon its interpretation of the contracts, the Court rules as a 
matter of law that plaintiff was not an intended third-party beneficiary of such contracts. See 
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Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzeerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981); and Ron Case Roofing A 
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). Although the contracts provide generally 
for the implementation of safety measures, the terms of the contracts cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the plaintiff in this case. 
Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the parties' contractual obligations of safety would 
clearly have been incidental. 
The Court farther grants defendants' motions for summary judgement against plaintiff 
to the extent that plaintiff may be attempting to assert his second and third claims (involving, 
alleged OSHA violations) as independent causes of action. The Court must agree with 
defendants that no independent action exists for the breach of OSHA standards. 
However, the Court denies the fourth and fifth motion enumerated above to the extent 
that defendant's seek to have plaintiffs second and third claims dismissed. In order to 
avoid procedural or formal difficulties that may arise, the Court will not dismiss plaintiffs 
second and third causes of action. The Court notes that while OSHA violations may not be 
the basis for an independent cause of action, evidence of such violations may be permitted as 
evidence of negligence (i.e. evidence of the relevant standard of care and the possible breach 
thereof). Accordingly, plaintiffs second and third causes are not to be regarded as alternate 
causes of action but rather alternate bases upon which negligence may be found. 
The Court is inclined to grant defendants' motions for summary judgement with 
regard to plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action on the basis that the facts involved in this case 
doe not appear to be legally sufficient to support plaintiffs claim of an "inherently dangerous 
condition." However, the Court will reserve its ruling on this issue until all the evidence has 
been introduced at trial. 
EXHIBIT " B " 
Finally, finding no need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed of 
in its prior ruling in this case, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing, filed 
January 22, 1993. 
Counsel for defendant J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this 
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum 
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 10th day of February, 1993. 
cc: Brent D. Young, Esq. 
Edward P. Moriarity, Esq. 
Lynn C. Harris, Esq. 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq. 
Mark Dal ton Dunn, Esq. 
Glenn C. Hanoi, Esq. 
John N. Braithwaite, Esq. 
%
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Robert R. Wallace, #3366 
John N. Braithwaite, #4544 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. Stale of Utah 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, S^ATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and A.B.P. 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, dba ABP 
Development Company, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene 
Peterson Concrete, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 910400292PI 
Judge Harding 
The following motions have been received and have been 
submitted for decision by the Court in this action: 
EXHIBIT "C" 
1. A.B.P. Enterprises7 Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc•; 
2. Clark Mechanical's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgement; 
3. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal; 
4. J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment; 
5. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiff; and 
6. Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing. 
The Court, having reviewed each of the foregoing 
motions, the memoranda filed in support thereof and in opposition 
thereto by the parties, having reviewed the relevant law, being 
fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS that A.B.P. Enterprises' ("A.B.P.") Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark 
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. ("Clark") is denied, and Clark's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P*'s claim for indemnity 
is granted. The Court finds that the indemnity provisions of the 
contract between A.B.P. and Clark make reference to liability that 
may arise from Clark's performance of the contract, but cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
9.) r ) 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal is 
denied. There is no contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. 
Sheet Metal, and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity provisions cf 
the contract between Clark and J.B. Sheet Metal. The Court 
further finds that the indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that J.B. 
Sheet Metal indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiff are granted in part and denied in part 
as follows: 
1. Consistent with the Court's prior ruling on 
Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment/ summary judgment is granted 
in favor of J.B. Sheet Metal and A.B.P. and against plaintiff on 
plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action. The Court rules that 
plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action is invalid to the extent that it 
is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract 
between A.B.P. and Clark or the contract between Clark and J.B. 
Sheet Metal. The plaintiff was not an intended third-party 
beneficiary of either of the contracts. Although the contracts 
provide generally for the implementation of safety measures, the 
terms of the contracts cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the 
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plaintiff. Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the 
contractual obligations of the parties would clearly have been 
incidental. 
2. The Court further grants summary judgment in favor 
of all the defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff's Second 
and Third Causes of Action to the extent that the plaintiff 
alleges the Second and Third Causes of Action as independent 
causes of action. The Court finds that no independent action 
exists for the breach of OSHA standards. Evidence of OSHA 
violations may not be the basis of an independent cause of action, 
but may be permitted only as evidence of negligence. However, the 
Court does not dismiss plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of 
Action. They are not alternate causes of action, but rather 
alternate bases upon which negligence may be found. 
3. With regard to all the motions for summary judgment 
on plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, the Court finds that the 
facts involved in this action do not appear to be legally 
sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of an inherently dangerous 
condition. However, the Court reserves its ruling on this issue 
until all of the evidence has been introduced at trial. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for 
Rehearing, filed January 22, 1993, is denied. The Court finds no 
need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed 
of in its prior ruling. 
c' vj 0 D 
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DATED this 7 day of y V % £ ^ ^ £ , 1992C? 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
Attorney for A.B.P. 
Enterprises 
GLENN C. HANN# 
Attorney for Clark 
Mechanical 
LYNN C. HARRIS 
Attorney for plaintiff 
Richard HeaJ 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Gene 
Peterson Concrete 
Attorney for J,B. 
Sheet Metal 
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A B P D E V E L O P M E N T C O M P A N Y 
CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 11th day of September, 1990, by and 
between ABP Enterprises, Inc., dba ADP Development Company, of Orem, Utah, hereinafter referred 
to as General Contractor, and CLARK MECHANICAL, of Provo, Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
Sub-Contractor. 
A. SPECIAL TERMS: 
1. Job Description: #910, Building KL 
2. The Sub-Contractor shall perform for the General Contractor at or near 1359 N. Res. Way, 
Orem, Utah, the hereinafter described work, and under the conditions and terms contained herein. 
3. Work shall be commenced September 1, 1990, diligently prosecuted, and completed by 
Februaiy 1, 1991. 
4. General Contractor shall pay Sub-Contiactor, in accordance with statements prepared by the 
Sub-Contractor, a compensation of ($ 930,409.00), as specified under 2D (1) and (2). 
B. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
1. PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK 
( a ) S p e c i f i c a t i o n s a n d S t a n d a r d s : Sub-
contractor shall perform the work in accordance with (1) the 
plans and specifications and exhibits, if any, for said job, and 
(2) according to oil standards prescribed by law or by anylxidy 
having the right to prescribe minimum standards. 
( b ) P e r m i t s : Unless otherwise provided herein, Sub-
Contractor shall, at Sub-Contractor's sole cost and expense, 
seen i t all necessary permits, make all cash or other deposits, 
furnish all bonds, and give all notices required by law. 
(c.) Materials, Equipment, Labor: Unless 
otherwise provided herein, Sub-Contractor shall furnish all 
material, utilities, supplies, tools, and equipment, and perform 
all labor. 
( d ) S a f e t y M e a s u r e s : Sub-Contractor shall take all 
reasonable precautions to protect the work, workmen, and the 
public; and shall provide, where reasonably necessary, barriers, 
guards temporary bridges, lights, and watchmen. 
( e ) Please see attached Exhibit "A* for specifications. 
2 . C O M P E N S A T I O N 
( a ) E x t r a W o r k : Sub-Contractor shall be entitled to 
payment for extra work performed only if such work shall 
have been previously authorized in writing by the General 
Contractor. 
( b ) T a x e s : The compensations provided herein includes 
and Sub-Contractor shall pay all State and Federal payroll 
taxes, including contributions or taxes assessed against 
employees on wages earned, in connection with the work. 
Sub-Contractor agrees to indemnify Genera! Contractor for all 
liability in connections therewith and to make all reports 
required thereunder. The compensation ulso includes an 
amount on account of all other taxes now or hereafter 
imposed by am governmental authority upon, measured hy or 
incident to, i|.*» performance of this contract or the purchase, 
storage, use oi consumption by the Sub-Contractor of material 
us«*d in the performance of this contract. 
<C) A c c e p t a n c e o f W o r k : Acceptance shall boon the 
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date the work is completed to the General Contractor's 
satisfactions. No payment hereunder shall constitute an 
acceptance of defective work or improper materials. 
(d) Terms of Payment: (l) At the end of each 
calendar month during the progress of the work, and upon 
completion of the en tire work, Sub-Contractor shall be entitled 
to receive eighty-five percent (85%) of the compensation 
provided herein for the work performed during that month. 
The balance shall be payable 35 days after acceptance, provided 
there arc no undischarged or unsecured liens, attachments, or 
claims in connection with the work. General Contractor may 
require, as a condition to payment, that Sub-Contractor 
submit evidence, by receipted bills or otherwise, that all costs 
incurred for the work have been paid. (2) When payments arc 
due as provided above, Sub-Contractor shall prepare 
statements of amounts payable. Such statements shall show 
Uic total compensation for the work performed to date, less 
any previous payments. 
3- DELAYS 
The time for completion shall be extended for such period 
that the Sub-Contractor is delayed by acts of God or the 
elements, or by other causes beyond Sub-Contractor's 
reasonable control, including civil disorders and labor 
disturbances. 
4.INSPECTIONAPPROVAUCANCELLATION 
( a ) I n s p e c t i o n s : General Contractor shall have the 
right to visit and inspect the work, or any part thereof, at all 
times. Sub-Contractor shall keep a competent man in the 
immediate vicinity of the work to receive communications 
from General Contractor and to supervise the work. 
( b ) A p p r o v a l : General Contractor may reject 
materials, whether worked or unworked, and all portions of 
the work which appear to be unsound or defective or failing in 
any way to conform with the specifications hereof; Sub-
Contractor shall remove such rejected materials or portions of 
the work from the premises within twenty-four (21) hours 
flftcr receiving notice thereof from Gctirral Omtractor. If 
removal of rejected materials or work should result in damage 
In materials furnished Uy Gcnenil Contractor. Sub-Contractor 
shall furnish new materials of identical kind and quantity 
without cost to General Contractor. 
<C) C a n c e l l a t i o n : (1) Should Sub-Contractor fail, 
refuse, or neglect to supply sufficient material to be supplied 
by Sub-Contractor hereunder; or tools, labor, or properly 
skilled workmen to complete the work hereunder with 
reasonable diligence and dispatch, for three (3) days after 
written notice of such default to Sub-Contractor, the General 
Contractor may at any time thereafter take over and complete 
the work. The cost to the General Contractor of completing 
such work shall be deducted from any moneys due Sub-
Contractor. If such cost exceeds any such moneys, Sub-
Contractor shall reimburse the General Contractor. (2) 
Should the Sub-Contractor seek relief under any law for the 
benefit of insolvents, or be adjudged as bankrupt, the General 
Contractor may at any time thereafter terminate this 
agreement and complete the work as provided in Section 4(C)( 
f> hereof, except that any payments due from Sub-Contractor 
to vendors for material supplied for work hereunder may be 
made direct by the General Contractor to such vendors, and be 
deducted from the amounts otherwise due to the Sub-
Contractor. (3) General Contractor may, at his absolute 
discretion, stop the work at any time, hut where Sub-
contractor is not in default hereunder. General Contractor 
shall pay Sub-Con tractor for nil work done in conformity with 
the plans and specifications. 
5. LIABILITY 
( a ) G e n e r a l L i a b i l i t y : Sub-Contractor shall 
indemnify and save General Contractor, its officers or agents 
harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, injury, 
liability, and claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons, 
and all loss of or damage to property of others, resulting di-
rectly or indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this 
contract 
( b ) L i a b i l i t y f o r E x i s t i n g P r o p e r t y : Sub-
contractor shall be liable to General Contractor for any loss 
of or damage to existing property resulting directly or 
indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this contract 
to the extent of the applicable insurance which Sub-Contractor 
has in force at the time of the occurrence and which shall not 
be less than the amount provided in Section G hereof. 
(c) Liability for the Work Hereunder: Sub-
Contractor shall exercise due care and diligence in the conduct 
of the work hereunder and in the care and protection of any 
material or equipment furnished by General Contractor to 
Sub-Contractor therefor. Such work, material, or equipment 
lost or damaged by fire, storm, or any other cause whatsoever, 
Sub-Contractor shall reconstruct, repair or replace. 
(d) Employer's Liability: Sub-Contractor shall 
perform the work hereunder in conformance with all 
applicable Federal and Stntc labor laws, and shull indemnify 
and save General Contractor harmless from any and all 
liability, claims, costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature 
under such laws arising out of the performance of this 
contract. 
( e ) L i e n s : Sub-Contractor shall discharge at once or 
shall bond against all liens which may be filed in connection 
with the work performed by Sub-Contractor, ond shall save 
the General Contractor and the owners of the premises upon 
which the work is performed harmless therefrom. 
( 0 A t t o r n e y ' s F e e s : Sub-Contmctor shall pay („ 
General Contractor a reasonable attorney fee, in any Icjjai 
nction in which the General Contractor prevails, brought 
against Sub-Con tractor based on a breach of this contract 
6- INSURANCE 
Sub-Con tractor shall maintain at all times during thc 
performance of work hereunder the following insurance in 
companies and on terms satisfactory to General Contractor: 
(1) Workmen's Compensation Insurance, as prescribed or 
permitted by law. (2) Property Damage, Liability Insurance, 
including automobile, covering property of others and property 
of General Contractor other than the work performed under 
this contract, in an amount not less that $1,000,000.00 for 
each occurrence. 
7. ASSIGNMENT 
( a ) A s s i g n m e n t : This agreement shall not be 
assigned, sublet, or transferred in whole or in part by the Sub-
Contractor, except with the previous written consent of the 
General Contractor. 
(b) Assignment by General Contractor, it 
is expressly agreed that General Contractor may assign all of 
its rights and interest hereunder to the owner, and that in 
such event, Sub-Contractor shall continue in its performance 
hereunder as if no assignment had been made. 
8- CONTRACTOR'S UNDERSTANDING 
It is undervood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor, as the 
result of careful examination, is satisfied as to the nature and 
location of the work, the conformation and structure of the 
ground, the character, quality, and quantity of the materials 
(., «.c used, the character of equipment and facilities needed 
prohminary to and during the prosecution of the work, the 
general and local conditions, and all other matters which can 
in any way afTcct the work under this contract No 
representations by or oral agreement with any officer, agent, 
or employee of the General Contractor, either before or after 
the execution of this contract, shall affect or modify any of the 
Sub-Contractor's rights or obligations hereunder. 
It is further understood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor 
is bound and will comply with ail the terms and conditions of 
the labor agreements to which the General Contractor is a 
party, insofar as said labor agreements lawfully require the 
Sub-Contractor to be so bound. 
SUB-CONT^A^^f^, 
By: c£r>^CsC~*~*{ — 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR: 
ABP DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
By: /pU* ^A^M^^- . 
coi: - ' • ' • } • • • - y 
EXHIBIT "D 
DEC c s i99o SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT 
_
 3 Provo 23rd 
THIS AGREEMENT made at . _ _ , Utah, this _ day of 
October l^fi 90 hy ^u.i-~~ Clark Mechanical Contractors/ Inc. 
_ f P r o v o , Utah ^ kcrelnafier referred to a* the Contractor, .nd J « B . S h e e t 
Metal/ Inc. 
2487 South 3270 West West Valley City, Utah 84119 
hereinafter rehired to ai the Subcontractor. We bind ourselves, our heirs, executory administrators, antecessors, mud assigns 
Jointly and aetcraUy firmly by these presents. 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the covenants herein contained, the Contractor and iht Subcontractor 
afree ax folJowx: 
1. SCOPE OF WORK 
That the worl to be performed by the Subcontractor tinder the terms of this agreement consists of the foliofrinx;: 
Furnkhbi of all labor and material, tools, implements, and equipment, acaffoldinf, permits, fees, e t c , to do all of the 
follow-in*: Bldg. #9 Specs to apply/ 15000 General/ 15030 System commissioning/ 15042 
Testing/ 15043 Balancing/ (Including I.D* and O&M)/ 15050 Basic Materials and 
Methods/ 15180 Insulation (DucLvrap and breaching)/ 15800 Air distribution. 
Total price (Including tax addenda, and alternate)..•.. $297/903.00 
When the Subcontractor dots cot install aU material furnished ender this Subcontract auch material as Is cot installed 
k to be delivered F/>.B Orem J o b s i t e 
(A <T U^ . Brower & Associates fe strict accordance with the plans and ape ai l cations as prtptied by . 
u* WordPerfect Bldg. #10 
^ ^XrchiUcl and/or Engineer, for the construction of . 
0 ^ 
Tor WordPerfect Corp.
 ChrDCTt 
for which constructioD the Contractor has the prime contract with the Owner; together with aU addenda or authorized 
changes issued prior to the dale of execution of this agreement. 
The Contractor and the Subcontractor atjree to be bound by iht ternis of iht prime contract agreement, construction 
regulations, general conditions, plans and apecifications, and any and all other contract documents, If any there be, insofar 
as applicable to this subcontract agreement, and to that portion of iht wori herein describe^ to be performed by the Subcon-
tractor. 
In thf event of any doubt or question arising between thf Contractor and the Subcontractor with ttipeci to the plans 
and specification/ the decision of iht Architect and/or Enfineei shall b< conclusive and binding Should there be nosuper-
tbiof, architect orer th< **orl, then the matter in question shell b< determined ai provided in Section 7 of the agreement. 
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prorreis of the entire comirucuon, «iu »u«i« ww. *v — • / «* V W C ^ J K , . . ^ - - . . - . -^vi 
or any other Subcontractor, and in the event that the Subcontractor ©ejects and/or fails to supply the necenary fcbor 
and/or materials tools. Implement*, equipment, etc.. In the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor ah.11 notify the 
Subcontractor In writing setting forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after date of inch written notice, the 
Contractor ahall ba%e the rifhl If be ao dcxire* to take over the work of the Subcontractor in full, and exclude the Subcon-
tractor from any further participation in the work covered by this agreement; or, at bis option the Contractor may take 
over auch portion of the Subcontractor'a work an the Contractor ahall deem to be in the best interest of the Contractor, and 
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portion* of the work. WbicheTer method the Contractor mifht elect 
to pursue the Subcontractor a^reex to release to the Contractor, for bit we only, without recount, any materials, took. 
ImplemenU equipment, etc.. on tht aite, b e l o n g to or in the possession of the Subcontractor, for the benefit of the Con-
tractor in wmpJclinf the work covered in this agreement; and, the Contractor agree* to complete the work to the beat of 
his abiHty and in the most economical manner available to him at the time. Any costs incurred by the Contractor in doing 
any auch portion of the work covered by this agreement «hall be charged against any monies due or to become due under the 
terms of this arreement, mnd in the event the total amount due or to become due under the terms of this agreement shall be 
Insufficient to cover the* costs accrued by the Contractor in completing the work, then the Subcontractor and his sureties, if 
any. ahall be bound and liable unto the Contractor for the difference. 
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work coder this contract depend wholly or partially 
upon the proper workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcon-
tractors on the project, the Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to discover any such defects and report same in 
writinr to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which is so dependent; and shall allow to the Contractor a reason-
able time In which to remedy auch defects; and in the event he does not ao report to the Contractor fa writing, then it ahalJ 
be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and he ahall be fully respon-
sible thereafter for the satisfactory performance of the work covered by this agreement, regardless of the defective work of 
others. 
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor, all rubbish and debris re-
sulting from his work Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall terve as cause for withholding further payment to Sub-
contractor until such time as this condition is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor. Also he shall clean up to the 
•atisfaclion of the inspectors, all dirt, frease marks, e t c , from walls, ceil ing floors fatum.ctc^ deposited or placed thereon 
as a result of the execution of this subcontract If the Subcontractor refuses or faus to perform this deamng as directed by 
the Contractor the Contractor ahall have the ri*ht and power to proceed with the said cleaning, and the Subcontractor will 
en demand r*W to the Contractor the actual cost of aaid labor plus a reasonable percentage of such cost to cover super-
vision, insurance, overhead, e t c 
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all Kquidated damages that may be assessed against 
and collected from the Contractor by the Owner, which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor's failure to 
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for 
herein and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may 
sustain by reason of such delay by the Subcontractor. The payment of such damages shall not release the Subcontractor 
from bis obligation to otherwise fully perform this Subcontract. 
Whenever It may be useful or necessary to the Contractor to do so, the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or 
sise anv portion of the work which has been cither partially or fuUy completed by the Subcontractor before final inspection 
and acceptance thereof by the Owner, but such tise and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of 
aaid work and materials nor of his obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which 
tnav occur or develop prior to Contractor's release from responsibility to the Owner. Provided, howeveir the Subcontractor 
shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such portion of the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor, 
nor for any damage thereto thai is due to or caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor during such penodof use. 
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work, property and/or materials until completer> and final accepUnce of 
the Contact by the Owner, and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such accepUnce and shall pay promptly lor 
all materials and labor furnished to ihe project. In the event of ioss or damage, be shall proceed promptly to make repairs, or 
replacement of the damaged work, property and/or materials at bis own expense, as directed by the Contractor. Subcon-
tractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor s work, 
property or materials. 
It is agreed that the Subcontractor, at the option of the Contractor, may be considered as disabled from so complying 
whenever a petition in Bankruptcy or for the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him. 
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all the obligations tnd responsibilities that the Contractor assumes 
toward the Owner The Subcontractor shalJ indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against.and uve them harmless from, 
any and all loss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions 
or covenants of this contract. 
Subcontractor trees to fully comply with the Occupational Safety I Health Act of 1970 and any and all regulations 
*uJ^T£*T$ubconU*ll« as a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save the contractor harmless 
iwT.nv^H ^ o c h a l s of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fc.1l> comply with the act and regulations and 
a r e ^ t o r e t W £ contractor for any fines, damage or expense.- of any kind incurred by the contractor by reason of 
lh< subcontractor's failure to comply. 
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4. PERMITS. LICENSES, FEES, TAXES, ETC. 
The Subcontractor shall, at hi* own co£t and expense, apply for and obtain til necessary permits and licenses and shall 
.conform strictly lo the laws and ordinances in force in the locality where the work under the project is being done, insofar 
as applicable to work covered by this agreement. The Subcontractor shall hold harmless the prime Contractor against liabilily 
by rc^on of the Subcontractor having failed to pay federal, state, county or municipal taxes. 
5. *m&mmo&-
The Subcontractor agrees to provide and maintain workmen's compensation insurance and to comply in alj respecU 
with the employment and payment of labor, required by any constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the area in 
which the work is performed 
The Subcontractor agrees to cany comprehensive public liability and property damage insurance, and such other 
insurance as the Contractor might deem necessary, in amounts as approved by the Contractor, in order to protect the Con-
tractor *nd Subcontractor against loss resulting from any acts of the Subcontractor, his agents, and/or employees. Such 
insurance shall not be less than limits and coverages required in the fenerai contract documents. 
The Subcontractor agTecs to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor, of such insurance, including copies of the 
policies, when requested to do so by the Contractor. 
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full force and effect in a company or companies satisfactory 
to Contractor, shall be maintained at Subcontractor's expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance 
being supplied by Subcontractor to Contractor), and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor muit be 
notified by ten (10) d*ytf written notice before cancellation of any such policy. In event of threatened cancellation for non-
payment of premium, Contractor may pay aame for Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts then or sub-
sequently owing to Subcontractor hereunder. 
6. CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS 
The Contractor may add to or deduct from the amount of work covered by this agreement, and any changes made in 
the amount of work involved, or any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in 
detail the changes involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Sub-
contractor if such be possible; and iS such mutual agreement is not possible, then the T&lue of the work shall be determined as 
prorided in Section 7 of this agreement. -In either event, however, the Subcontractor agrees lo proceed with the vsorl. as 
changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not to delay the piogrcu of the work, and pending any determi-
nation of the value thereof. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional work outside the scope of this contract unless terms hereof 
shall be conclusive with respect of this agreement between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall be made within one 
"week from date of completion. 
The Subcontractor zhzl) net sublet, trtrxfer or assign this agreement cr any Inzds due Or to become due or any part 
thereof without the written consent of the Contractor. 
7. DISPUTES 
In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute 
shall be settled in the manner provided by the contract documents. If none be provided, or if there arises any dispute con-
cerning matters in connection with this agreement, and without the scope of the work, then such depute* shall be settled by 
a ruling of a board of arbiirstion consisting of three members, one selected by the Contractor, one by the Subcontractor and 
the third member shall be selected by the first two members. The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of 
their selected members respectively, but the expenses of the third member shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the 
arbitration in writing. 
The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by the findings of any *uch boards of arbitration, finally and 
without recourse to any court of la*. 
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in xnonthJy paymenti of ±£ *> of the work performed in auy preceding BQODLD, ID accordance with estimate* 
prepared by the Subcontractor and a* approTed by the Contractor • nrf A r c h i t e c t / O w n e r J 
; tuch payments Yo be made ax payments are received by the Contractor from the Owner 
covering the monthly extimite* of tht Contractor, Including the approved portion of the Subcontractor*! monthly cstimat 
In the rrenl the Subcontractor doet not submit to the Contractor *uch monthly estimate* prior to the date of lubmii-
aion of the Contractor* monthly estimate, then the Contractor thalJ include in bii monthly estimate to the Owner for work 
performed during the preceding month atjcb amount ax he ahaU deem proper for the work of the Subcontractor for the pre-
ceding month and the Subcontractor agree* to accept aucu approved portion thereof ax his regular monthly payment as 
described above. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make food without cost to th* Owner or Contractor any and all defect* due to faulty 
workmanship and/or materials which may appear within the period so established in the contract documents; and if no tuch 
period be stipulated in the contract documents, then auch guarantee shall be for a period of one year from date of completion 
of the project. The Subcontractor further Agrees to execute any apecial guarantees ax provided by terms of the Contract 
documents, prior to final payment. 
In the event ft appears to the Contractor that the labor, material and other bills incurred in the performance of the 
work art cot being currently paid, the Contractor may take such ateps as It deems necessary to assure absolutely that the 
fnoney paid with any progress payment will be utilized to the full extent necessary to pay labor, material and all other bills 
incurred in the performance of the work of Subcontractor. The Contractor may deduct from any amount* due or to become 
due to the Subcontractor any aum or aums crvring by the Subcontractor to the Contractor; and in the event of any breach by 
the Subcontractor of any provision or obligation of this Subcontract, or in the event of the assertion by other parties of any 
clnitti 49T Urn ftgninct ll»f Contractor or Contractor'* Surety or the premltci nrUinp out of the Subcontractor'* performance of 
this Contract, the Contractor aball have the right, but is not required, to retain out of amy payments due or to become due to 
the Subcontractor an amount sufficient to completely protect the Contractor from any and all loss, damage or expense there-
from, tmtn the situation has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcontractor to the satisfaction of the Contractor. These 
provisions shall be applicable even though the subcontractor has posted a full payment and performance bond. 
9 . TERMINATION OF CONTRACT 
In tht event the prime contract between the Owner and the Contractor ahould be terminated prior to its completion, 
then the Contractor and Sdbcontractor agree that an equitable settlement for work performed under tht* agreement prior to 
avudi termination, wHJ be made a* provided by the contract documents, if auch provision be made; or, if none sveh exist, next 
by mutual agreement; or, tailing either of these methods, by arbitration as provided in Section 7. 
10. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
During the performance of (hU subcontract, the Subcontractor agrees to no( discriminate agninsl tny employee bcoiu.se 
of race, color, creed or national origin. As outlined in the Equal Opportunity Clause of the Regulations of Executive Order 
10925 of March 6,1961 as amended by Executive Order 11246 of September 24,1965. The executive orders and the respec-
tive regulations art made a part of this subcontract by reference. 
11. TERMS OF LABOR AGREEMENTS 
It is hereby understood and agreed that for the work covered by this subcontract, the Subcontractor is bound and 
-will comply with the terms and conditions of the labor agreements to which the general contractor h t party. Insofar as aaid 
labor agreements lawfully require subcontractors td^be so bound. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contractor and Subcontractor signify their understanding and agreement with the terms 
hereof by affixing their signatures hereunto. 
WITNESS: 
Clark Mechanical Contractors/ Inc. 
717 Columbia Lane ^ 
<A<jdreto Stephen l). ciarx 
Provo, Utah 84604 
J.B. Sheet Metal/ Inc. 
<SubconliACtor) 
2487 South 3270 West »„^?..<»0PD,, A ^ , ,"£zL 
(Addicu) / ' 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
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Clark Mechonlca! Contractors. Inc. 
This statement Is attached and made a part of the Clark Kechanical Cont-
ractors/ Inc. Subcontract Agreement: 
(32) The federally assisted construction contractor certifies that he does 
rot maintain or provide for his employees any segregated f a c i l i t i e s at any 
of Ms establishments, and that he does not permit his employees to perforc 
their cervices et any location, under his control, v-here segregated f a c i l i t i e s 
ere eaintained. The federally assisted construction contractor c e r t i f i e s 
further that he will not maintain or provide for his employees any segregated 
faci l i t ies at any of his establishments, end thai he v i l l not permit h i s 
employees to perform their services et any location, under his control, where 
segregated'facilities ere maintained. The federally assisted construction 
contractor agrees that a breach of this certification i s a violation of the 
Equal Opportunity clause in this contract. As used in this cer t i f i ca t ion , 
the term "segregated f a c i l i t i e s " means any waiting rooms, work ereas, r e s t 
rooms end wash rooms, restaurants and other eating ereas. time clocks, locker 
rooos and other storage or dressing areas, parking lots , drinking fountains, 
recreation or entertainment areas, transportation, and-housing f a c i l i t i e s pro-
vided for employees which ere segregated by explicit directive or ere "in fac t 
segregated on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin, because of 
habit, local custom, or other reason. The federally assisted construction 
contractor agrees that (except where he has obtained identical cer t i f i ca t ions 
froa proposed contractors for specific time periods) he-vill obtain ident i ca l 
certifications from proposed subcontractors prior to the award of subcontracts _ 
exceeding $10,000 which ere not exempt from the provisions of the Equal Opportune 
clause, end that he will retain such certifications in his f i l e s . 
$-23-^0 
Signa 
Stephen D. Clark President 
Name and Title of Signer (Please type) 
Date 
NDTE: The penalty for making f a l s e statements in offers i s prescribed 
in 18 V. S. C. 1001 
/no^iS 
n v T T T n T m 
To be added to Parag* 10 "Equal Employment G; -ortunity* 
Clark Mechanical Contractors^ Inc. is a non-exempt federal contractor 
and is subject to the following regulations: 41 CFR 60-1.4 (a) (7)/ 
41 CFR 60-250.4 (m),( and 41 CFR 60-741.4(f). 
Statement of Certification on Nonsegregated Facilities (See Attachment.; 
Also a part of this subcontract. 
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